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Abstract
Intergovernmental Conferences are generally seen as key events in the design of the European
Union. This paper challenges this traditional view. Arguing that treaty reform should be regarded as
a continuous process rather than a series of events, the paper develops a procedural understanding
of constitutional change based on structuration theory. In such a perspective, analytical attention is
re-directed from the political limelight of largely ceremonial events to the more obscure 'valleys' –
the periods between the IGC summits in which the more momentous developments of European
integration occur. The study of past instances of constitutional change as well as an analysis of the
IGC leading to the Amsterdam Treaty demonstrate the significance of a wider set of actors and of
the structural environment: the trajectory of past decisions, the multilateral generation of reform
agendas, the institutionalised patterns of negotiation and decision-making and the
constitutionalisation of the EU order. This severely limits the ability of national governments to
negotiate on the basis of 'national interests' and thus dissolves one of the cornerstones of
intergovernmentalism – the over-arching significance of IGCs.
Kurzfassung
Regierungskonferenzen werden allgemein als die wichtigsten Ereignisse in der Entwicklung der
Europäischen Union angesehen. Dieser Beitrag wendet sich gegen diese traditionelle Auffassung.
Vertragsänderungen sollten nicht als eine Reihe von Ereignissen, sondern als ein kontinuierlicher
Prozess verstanden werden. Dieses Papier entwickelt dementsprechend eine
strukturationstheoretische Perspektive europäischer Verfassungsreformen, die den analytischen
Schwerpunkt vom politischen Rampenlicht der Regierungskonferenzen auf die eher unzugänglichen
Täler zwischen diesen Gipfeltreffen verlegt. Tatsächlich sind es diese Täler, in denen die historisch
wichtigen Entwicklungen der europäischen Einigung ihren Ursprung haben. Sowohl die
Entwicklunggeschichte des europäischen Verfassungsprozesses wie auch die Analyse der jüngsten
Regierungskonferenz, die zum Vertrag von Amsterdam führte, belegen die Wichtigkeit einer über
Regierungsvertreter hinausreichenden Zahl von Akteuren und des strukturellen Umfeldes: die
Pfadabhängigkeit früheren Entscheidungen, die multilaterate Entstehung der Reformpläne, die
Institutionalisierung von Verhandlungsführung und Entscheidungsfindung sowie die Verfassung
einer europäischen Ordnung. All dies schränkt den Spielraum der Regierungen stark ein, auf der
Basis 'nationaler Interessen' zu verhandeln, und somit verschwindet einer der Eckpfeiler des
Intergouvernmentalismus – die überragende Bedeutung von Regierungskonferenzen.
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I. Introduction
Intergovernmental Conferences are generally seen as key events in the design of the European Union,
the moment at which Member State governments re-assert their hold on the institutional dynamics of
the EU(1). In this paper we challenge this traditional intergovernmentalist view of treaty reform.
Rather than a succession of relatively rare ‘events’, treaty reform should instead be regarded as a
continuous process.(2) In so far as IGCs actually perform a function for national governments, this is
rather ceremonial (states celebrating their status as states) and disciplinary (states exerting a slightly
greater than usual degree of control over the agenda and time-scale of reform) than actually
decisional. In the absence of a complete and final Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the EU, IGCs constitute
the attempt by governments to assert their control of the expanding portfolio of EU competences. But
the wave of IGCs during the 1990s, we believe, demonstrates conclusively the opposite: governments
have lost command and control not just over every-day EU business, but even over something as
‘intergovernmental’ as treaty reform.
Rather than merely adding to the growing list of substantial critiques of intergovernmentalism, this
paper is directed at developing a novel, structurationist perspective on EU Treaty reform.(3) Our
approach is based mainly on the recognition that the crucial object of analysis cannot be Member
State interests, but the process in which these are constructed. Structuration theory, an approach
developed by Anthony Giddens (1984) and increasingly debated by a number of scholars in
International Relations – though still rare in European Studies – offers a meta-theoretical framework
for such an exercise, since it explicitly demands the integration of agency and of structural
explanations into a holistic perspective.(4) Political actors and social structures are conceived as
co-constituting one another, and it is the focus on the interplay between these two factors which
makes process the object of analysis.
The time is certainly ripe for such a perspective on the EU. The last ‘instance’ of treaty revision, the
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the end of an intergovernmental ‘conference’ which had in fact taken more than a year to define the
‘choices’ of Heads of State and Governments. The IGC process involved numerous presidency drafts,
and the submissions to the conference from national governments, EU institutions and
non-governmental organizations spawned an impressive Commission-run website.(5) But the IGC
was itself part of a wider process of pre-reform, which included activities of the Reflection Group as
well as a number of formal and informal review exercises at the Member State and European level. In
any case, the brief for treaty reform was already enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, and the ultimate
question for national delegations was never the ‘if’, only the ‘how’ of treaty reform.
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Neither did the reform process end in Amsterdam. By contrast, a number of crucial "non-decisions",
mainly about the re-alignment of the Council voting mechanism, mean that further high-level meetings
will be necessary, while other important decisions about the institutional shape have been left to
uncertain automatisms which are linked to the entry of new Member States. There is, as yet, no clear
picture about the final shape of the reform effort. And just as in Maastricht, also Amsterdam already
includes the agreement on the next phase of treaty reform, which is, in any case, necessitated by the
prospect of enlargement, now more imminent after the publication of Agenda 2000 and decisions
taken on enlargement at the 1997 European Council meeting in Luxembourg.
In this paper we develop a process-based understanding of treaty-reform. As part of this process,
IGCs deserve particular attention. But whereas IGCs are traditionally seen as summits, both in
political and in analytical terms, we seek to re-direct analytical attention away from the political
limelight and into the ‘valleys’ – the periods between the IGC-summits during which in fact the more
momentous developments of European integration have occurred. If this paper succeeds in its aims, it
will not only dissolve one of the cornerstones of intergovernmentalism – the over-arching significance
of IGCs – but also provide an outline of an alternative conception of treaty reform in the European
Union. Based on arguments about the nature of treaty reform as constitutionalization and on the
essentially procedural nature of this aspect of European integration, future research should then be
able to identify more authoritatively where, and how, and by whom, fundamental decisions about
treaty reform have been taken.
II. A Structurationist Perspective on European Integration
‘Amsterdam’, in our conception, was in fact a summit: but not so much in the conventional sense of
the all-important, "make-or-break" meeting of senior statesmen, but rather as the high-point of a
sloping curve that describes the ups and downs in the lengthy process of treaty review, reform and
revision. Similar things can be said about Maastricht, which was preceded by 18 months of
negotiation and followed by an even longer phase of ratification. Maastricht and Amsterdam, and the
IGCs that preceded and succeeded these European Council meetings, cannot be seen as isolated
instances of reform. Member States did not come to the conference table each with their set of
‘national interests’, and the ‘final outcome’ was not the compromise or lowest common denominator
between these. Throughout, the reform process has been structured massively, through the
pre-defined demands on the IGC, the convergence of beliefs about its outcome, the institutionalized
allocation of interests built into the EU system and the path-dependency of past choices.
3
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reform not as a succession of specific instances but as part of a larger ‘meta-process’ of
constitution-building and polity-formation in the European Union. Just as the Single European Act
and the ‘1992’ programme were structured by previous developments in the EU system – the Court’s
Cassis de Dijon judgement and the Commission’s White Paper on the Single Market – monetary
union agreed at Maastricht was based on the foundation of the European Monetary System and the
flexibility clause agreed at Amsterdam was preempted by the opt-outs and the experience of variable
geometry, which had already become a hall-mark of the EU system in the 1990s. Treating each IGC in
isolation means that this continuous process is cut up and thus a misleading image of significant
‘events’ dominated by actors is being created. If our perspective is a convincing one, then it follows
that the significant object of analysis should not be the IGC itself, and even less so the ‘Amsterdam
event’, but the ‘Amsterdam process’.
Questioning the ability of actors to ‘decide’ the course of historic processes such as European
integration always carries with it the danger of determinism on the other end of the spectrum, i.e.
handing over the explanatory power altogether to structural factors. While currently not much in
academic fashion, this has nevertheless been a frequent tendency with regard to the integration
process. Structural determinants have been with the European Community from its inception, whether
it involved the continent’s need to reconstruct, or the European response to the emerging bipolar
world of the 1950s, or the western bulwark against Communist expansion (the much cited ‘external
federator’ theme has always been around), or the ‘natural’ outcome of the communication and
technology revolutions in the 1980s, or the bare necessity as the third leg of the global economic triad
in the 1990s.(6)
No one would deny that all of these factors have played a role in the evolution of the European
Union, and we will in turn deal with the more important ones. The point to be made here, though, is
that none of them can be accepted as the ‘Big Factor’, the sole cause which has propelled the
integration process forward. Just as we are suspicious of the actor-centered voluntarism of
intergovernmentalism or neo-functionalism, we should be wary of structural determinism. Even a
cursory look at the history of the European Union demonstrates that individuals, particular actors
occupying a particular place at a particular time, had a massive influence in the course of events.
The study of the Amsterdam process, in a structurationist perspective, requires proper recognition of
both the number of actors involved in the process and the routines and practices structuring treaty
reform. Due to the actor-centered analysis of much of political science literature on EU
decision-making, we know quite a lot already about the actors involved in the process. Precisely
because the common approach to IGCs still appears to be centered around the abstract positions of
Member States rather than a concern with the negotiation among a group of individuals, much can be
gained from introducing insights from policy-analysis, diplomatic studies and sociological symbolic
inter-actionism about the socialization effects of continuous, face-to-face contact. By actors, then, we
mean individual civil servants, Commission officials, MEPs, national ministers and Prime Ministers
rather than personified states.
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More important still, in the context of a rigorously structurationist account of EU treaty reform, is the
identification of elements of structure. This includes a specific acquis conferencielle, our term for the
formal arrangements and institutional set-up of IGCs, which have emerged over the past decade and
to which IGC participants now have to conform. It also includes the path-dependency of institutional
development in the EU: IGCs do not start from a tabula rasa, on which national governments put
their shopping lists, but from an already existing mosaic to which some parts may be added and others
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shopping-list items are considered so inappropriate that they never make it to the IGC. There is also
the structuring force of the particular IGC discourse that precedes and pervades the negotiations.
Many actors actively contribute to this discourse, but in due course every participant – including those
from national governments – eventually becomes a respondent to previously made statements by
others.
Having identified these elements, our analysis demonstrates how it is this interplay between agency
and structure, rather than one or the other, which ultimately determines the nature and trajectory of
the process. This, we argue, sheds new light on the understanding of EU treaty reform and the wider
process of integration. In terms of the theoretical debate, it will provide a constructive critique of
inherently actor-centered approaches like intergovernmentalism. At the same time it helps produce an
account of integration as a constitutive process that is more rigorous than neo-functionalism, the more
process-oriented integration theory.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged difficulties of its application (Stones, 1991; Layder, 1987;
Gregson, 1987; 1989), we believe that a structurationist approach has significant value – not as a
grand theory but as an analytical perspective. It is of value for this kind of research because it
proposes a reconciliation of agency and structure through a focus on process – the process of
structuration. Since process is precisely what the study of European integration should be about, a
structurationist perspective is an obvious one to take when studying treaty reform. 
There is no space here for an exhaustive elaboration of the theory of structuration. It is, after all, less
of a theory than a set of abstract propositions about the reproduction of social life. For the purposes
of this paper, it needs to be adapted for empirical application. What follows is just a brief introduction
to the essential notions of structuration theory that are of relevance for our analysis.
The central concern for structuration theory is the resolution of the structure/agency problem in social
science. A key concept in this endeavour is the concept of a social praxis, which is defined as
the constitution of social life, i.e. the manner in which all aspects, elements and
dimensions of social life, from instances of conduct in themselves to the most
complicated and extensive types of collectivities are generated in and through the
performance of social conduct, the consequences which ensue and the social relations
which are thereby established and maintained... This view of praxis is equally relevant to
the constitution of action and the constitution of collectivities (Cohen, 1989: 12).
This focus on social praxis involves further theorizing on actors and structures. In structuration
theory, actors are being ‘de-centered’ ‘in favour of a concern for the nature and consequences of the
activities in which [they] engage during their participation in day-to-day life’ (Cohen, 1989: 12). Of
central significant is the concept of a ‘duality of structure’. Structures are understood as both medium
and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of
social practices and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this constitution (Giddens, 1979: 5).
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Through the concept of the duality of structure, structuration theory develops an account of the
institutionalization of social life – an account in which institutions are understood as established social
practices rather than as mere organizations. The structurationist points of departure are the rules,
norms and patterns of behaviour that govern social interaction. These are structures, which are, on the
one hand, subject to change if and when the practice of actors changes, but on the other hand
4 von 23 15.01.99 14:44
EIoP: Text 1999-001: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-001.htmstructure political life as actors re-produce them in their everyday actions. A brief glance at the way in
which this abstract understanding can be applied to EU treaty reform ought to demonstrate its utility.
As we noted, most research into treaty reform is of an actor-centered nature. Frequently, though,
agency is equated with the actions of Member States, which are assumed to act collectively in the
‘national interest’. But it doesn't take much deconstruction to recognize that ‘Member States’ as such
have no capacity to act. As we seek to show in this paper, if the ‘Member State’ is ‘unpacked’, the
image of hierarchy may be replaced with a more accurate picture of individual action based on
empirical research. This includes the recognition of internal divisions, for example when negotiators in
Brussels act in response to perceived opportunities and constraints at the conference table. It also
opens the possibility of transnational loyalties, such as the potential formation of policy-networks or
even epistemic communities among the national experts who conduct these ‘intergovernmental’
negotiations collectively and over long periods of time. Seen in this light, the single-actor-capacity
often attributed to Member States in the course of treaty reform is quickly exposed as a myth.
In cases where the intergovernmentalist approach does recognize that agency is located at the level of
the individual, these are usually identified as the senior officials in national administrations, permanent
representatives, ministers and prime ministers who are directly involved in the negotiations. But
whereas traditional research proceeds from there, assuming that it is agency within the Member States
which drives treaty revision, the structurationist perspective proposed here helps to draw a wider
circle of actors into the picture. If the long-term process of treaty reform is the starting point for
analysis, then Commission officials and Council Secretariat staff (who prepare the meetings and
thereby help to set the agenda), activists in non-governmental organizations (whose demands might
find their way into IGC deliberations) and the judges of the ECJ (whose interpretations of primary law
will transpose the letters of the treaty into practice) all have a part in treaty reform.
The analysis below provides details on the role these actors play in the treaty reform process. This
demonstrates, on the one hand, that agency matters, and that it is taken into account in a
structurationist approach advanced here. But it also shows that removing the ontological primacy,
which is traditionally bestowed upon Member State representatives in the analysis of treaty reform,
helps to remove some of the false assumptions about this aspect of European integration. ‘Proving’
that Member States are in control of ‘intergovernmental bargaining’ by starting with the input from
Member States is a tautology which ultimately obscures much of what is analytically relevant.
Beyond the inclusion of a wider set of actors, a structurationist perspective also adds to the analysis
by embedding them within social structures. Based on the recognition that no social action occurs
within a social vacuum, structuration theory situates the role of agency within the social structures
surrounding it. It does so not in any deterministic way, as agency is potentially able to change any
aspect of these structures. But the extent to which much agency reproduces rather than changes
political structures, the nature and the effect of these structures ought not to be ignored. Structuration
theory here draws attention to the ‘unconscious motivation’ of actors – the recognition that much of
what actors do is repetitive and regular practice based on internalized customs and norms rather than
due to any preconceived, rational intentions (Cohen, 1989: 52).
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Much of EU treaty reform has become structured by such ‘routine modes of conduct’ internalized by
the actors involved, just as much of EU decision-making more generally has become increasingly
regularized. In analogy to the acquis communautaire, we have termed this pattern of accepted
behaviour the acquis conferencielle. This includes, for example, the practical arrangements of
conference room negotiations as well as the procedures for the politically very sensitive drafting of
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are prepared by the Presidency with support from Council Secretariat and Commission.(7) This
arrangement is not an ‘iron law’, and – as the example of the Dankert draft of the Maastricht Treaty
demonstrated – agency might well come into play and lead to unforeseen – and perhaps unintended –
consequences.(8) But such examples are exceptions to the rule, which is one of the many rules of
treaty reform that actors normally do not question. In this perspective, it is analytically significant to
recognize that the acceptance of such ‘rules’ is not based on intentional action but on unconscious
modes of conduct – as identified by structuration theory.
Thus, structuration theory does not deny the freedom of agents to intervene and to change the course
of events. Instead, it develops an account of social life in which agents interact continuously with
rules, customs and other social institutions. The social practices, which result from this interaction,
constitute political and social structures. Structuration theory therefore does not point to any larger
structure controlling human behaviour, but simply recognizes "institutionalized routines as
constitutive of the daily transaction of events" (Cohen, 1989: 39). In advancing such a structurationist
account of treaty reform, we therefore do not point to any externally determining forces compelling
Member States in any way, but to the social practices and routines that their representatives and other
actors have developed and institutionalized in the process of treaty reform. Recognising these
elements of structure, as well as a more inclusive set of actors, is the additional value that
structuration theory brings to the analysis of EU treaty reform.
III. Treaty Reform and Constitutional Reform in the EU
Before applying the structuration approach to what we view as the ‘Amsterdam Process’, we need to
identify in more detail what we regard as the elements of treaty reform in the European Union, both in
principle and in history. From the above follows that a structurationist perspective is sceptical of both
voluntarism and determinism. Indeed, the approach is sceptical of any orthodox ism, whether
intergovernmentalism, structuralism, or methodological individualism. However, it is not only our
meta-theoretical perspective that differs from traditional perspectives – so does our understanding of
EU treaty reform.
The conventional understanding is that treaty reform is the result of changes in the treaty as a result of
an intergovernmental conference. As such, it is most commonly regarded as an event – the symbolic
reference point of this conception is, of course, the signing of a new or revised treaty during a
European Council meeting. This, after all, was how the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties received
their popular names. This approach has the obvious advantage of delimiting the inquiry to an often
short span of time and to formally organized venues. The intergovernmental nature of IGCs appears
to determine that prime decision-makers are governments. Other actors may try to influence the
agenda of IGCs, or they may try to influence the decision-making process at IGCs, yet governments
retain the power derived from being formal decision-makers. Such an understanding of treaty reform
makes various intergovernmental approaches the obvious choice, reducing research design to a choice
between various versions of intergovernmentalism, including neo-realism (Grieco, 1991), pragmatic
intergovernmentalism (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1990), liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik,
1994), rational choice (Garret, 1992), and game theory (Tsebelis, 1994). These versions have all been
‘proven’ in analytical battle, and the majority has been developed to a sophisticated level of inquiry.
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But in our view, this is a limited and limiting perspective, which distorts the procedural nature of
treaty reform. A broader conception would also include the interpretation or explication of existing
treaties, agenda-setting for the IGC and the post-IGC implementation of any decisions taken. To
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authoritative interpreters of EU primary law. This does not mean that any treaty interpretation goes.
Instead, certain (re)interpretations become, by various means and for various reasons, authoritative
and therefore trend-setting. We also include more than political decision-making because processes of
administrative implementation are widely regarded in administrative science to influence
policy-outcomes significantly. The literature on multi-level governance, for example, focuses
predominantly on policy-making. Yet, the governance problematique also includes aspects of
constitutional politics, organizational design and judicial politics. Our point of departure, then, is the
observation that the conventional approach to the study of EU treaty reform has, by and large, failed
to connect the analysis to the continuous process of EU constitutionalization.
Let us begin in the known world and on solid ground. Perhaps surprisingly, Kenneth Waltz (1979) can
be of great help for our exploration. Whereas he does not include many sentences on the EU he does
emphasize that in contrast to the international anarchical system, domestic systems are centralized and
hierarchical. How can Waltz’ distinction be helpful for our exploration? For one, it points to the close
but largely unexplored connection between realism and law. It is very much the pure, positive law
tradition that underpins realists’ conception of the international ‘anarchical’ system, indeed the key
distinction between hierarchy and anarchy. Next, and here we follow Stone’s observation that Waltz’
description of domestic systems "very much [is] the language of constitutional law" (1994: 449).
Waltz does not raise the issue of the relevance his description has for our understanding of the EU so
here we arrive at the point where we have to depart from Waltz.
But before going further, it is necessary to look at the intergovernmentalist approach to treaty reform
in more detail. Below is an argument which is exemplary of this approach and which therefore
deserves to be quoted at some length: 
The primacy of the Member States is reinforced by the fact that, unlike ‘normal’ states,
the EU is founded not on a constitutional but on a treaty base. In the first place this leads
to a balance of power between the centre and the parts (Member States) very different
from that which exists in federal systems, in that only the Member States are signatories
of the amended treaty. Second, the treaty basis allows Member States to isolate some
areas of policy from the ambit of the EU, limiting the power of the supranational
institutions over them, as they did with the creation of the pillared structure in the treaty
on European Union. Treaty evolution can occur without reference to previous
agreements. While constitutional amendments require attention to be paid to previous
developments, new developments can be quite separate, as with the signing of a treaty on
Political Union quite separate from the Treaty of Rome. This clearly endows Member
States with a large degree of control over institution-building (Hurrell and Menon, 1996:
391).
This is a bold statement that sounds convincing in its entirety. But by examining each aspect of this
statement we show that it is precisely this understanding of treaty reform which prevents an
alternative view – one in which Member States have very limited control over institution-building.
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In assessing "[t]he primacy of the Member States", Hurrell and Menon work with a unitary actor
conception of states. In talking about Member States they do not distinguish between national
governments (who are the formal players in IGCs) and other state- and non-state actors who
intervene in the process of constitutionalization outside IGCs. These actors are parliaments, national
courts, national central banks as well as domestic interest groups, all of which do have positions on
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state’ in the process of integration (1994), an awareness of the necessary internal differentiation of
Member States was added only with hindsight. And yet, as the first Danish Maastricht referendum and
the Maastricht judgement of the German Constitutional Court demonstrated, such domestic forces
have a potentially rather powerful influence on the negotiation and re-interpretation of any IGC
‘decision’. Lacking a way of distinguishing between governments and the much wider significance of
‘Member States’, Hurrell and Menon cannot measure the relative influence of these institutional
actors on the process, or, for that matter, the impact of the process on these actors.
Hurrell and Menon argue that "the EU is founded not on a constitutional but on a treaty base" and
that "Treaty evolution can occur without reference to previous agreements [and that, w]hile
constitutional amendments require attention to be paid to previous developments". But, whereas the
EC originally was indeed founded on a treaty base, it is now based on a constitutional legal order, or,
as the ECJ termed it, on a "constitutional charter". If they are denying the existence and significance
of this process of constitutionalization – which has created a so-called hard core of constitutional
principles which cannot be changed, not even by the Member States collectively – then Hurrell and
Menon might just as well deny the relevance of the ECJ.
Hurrell and Menon are looking for "a balance of power between the centre and the parts (Member
States)". But this focus may well be the reason that they are unable to identify any significant changes.
What is required in the analysis of treaty reform is not so much the balance of power between to
levels, but their interaction in the creation of new structures. In this regard, it is more useful to employ
a concept which views power in structural rather than in purely relational terms. What matters in a
system as densely structured as the EU is the evolution of structural forms of power, and analytical
concepts used to study this phenomenon ought to be able to capture that.
Hurrell and Menon claim that the foundations of the EU are "very different from that which exists in
federal systems, in that only the members states are signatories of the amended treaty" – in our view, a
very formalistic view of things. Certainly, Member States are the sole signatories of the amended
treaty, but the EU legal order is in fact very similar to the one which exists in federal systems (Weiler,
1991). Perhaps governments intended the EU legal order to be different from federal systems (they
have, after all, eschewed the dreaded F-word so far), but crucially it has become constitutionalized
even though governments are the ‘sole signatories of the amended treaty’.
9
According to Hurrell and Menon, "the treaty basis allows Member States to isolate some areas of
policy from the ambit of the EU, limiting the power of the supranational institutions over them".
Again a very formalistic assumption about the keeping of watertight compartments. The example of
the British Social Chapter opt-out, with its first directive on European Work Councils seeping into the
UK via the voluntary application of its provisions by industry, is a practical example of this dynamic.
Governments can try to isolate some areas of policy but they are hardly ever successful in such
attempts. Weiler’s (1993) critical evaluation of the pillar structure developed at Maastricht, which was
to fulfil precisely this function, convincingly demonstrates the ‘leaks’ between the divisions national
governments thought up as a response to the gradual loss of control over the process.
This leaves, in our view, very little substance to the "large degree of control over institution-building".
For a start, the statement begs the question of what is understood by "control". Clearly it can only be
seen in terms of ‘more’ or ‘less’ rather than absolute control. In that sense it is certainly possible to
look at institution-building during the first 45 years of European integration and come to the
conclusion that governments did not have a "large degree of control". From the outset, a secular
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precisely what key Member States such as France (under de Gaulle) and Britain (under Thatcher and
Major) vowed to prevent. Occasional ‘crises’ such as France’s ‘empty chair policy’ 1966-7 only serve
to demonstrate the way in which governmental attempts to impose control ultimately failed.
Governments may have sought to re-assert their control in this respect during the 1990s, but even
formally the 1996-97 IGC was not a ‘pure’ intergovernmental affair since the ‘right’ to participate
was granted to the European Commission and to European Parliament representatives.
Let us come back to what Hurrell and Menon know "as a fact": that the base of the EU is not
constitutional. We have reasons to doubt this "fact". Indeed our inquiry leads inevitably to the
conclusion that EU treaty reform is a constitutional process. In order to persuade sceptics and to
make our conclusion plausible, we take a broad view of constitutional reform, one that encompasses
constitutionalism (Weiler, 1997), constitutional law (Pescatore, 1981; Gialdino, 1995; Temple Lang,
1998), constitutional politics (Shapiro and Stone, 1994; Alter, 1996; Bellamy et al., 1996) and
constitutional interpretation (Graber, 1994; Ball, 1995: 250-72).
What is the exact relationship between treaty reform and constitutionalization? Our argument rests on
the recognition that there is a strong connection between the two processes, that, in fact, they are best
viewed as a single meta-process of constitutional reform. Our main reason for arguing this is that
treaties are far from being just the ‘frozen’ outcome of formal IGCs. Instead, treaties are undergoing
continuous change (reform) also, and probably primarily between IGCs. Treaties are being interpreted,
the meaning of provisions are being contested, discussed, or re-constituted. Sometimes certain
provisions are simply ‘framework agreements’. This means that they are, in themselves, ‘empty’, and
need to be given ‘substance’ in order to acquire a life of their own in order to be more than ‘dead
letters’ in a treaty text.
Generally, treaties are given life through repetitive, constitutive and sometimes controversial
processes of communicative action. Seen in this light, it is falsely formalistic to argue that the
constitutionalization of the Community legal order does not constitute an important aspect of treaty
reform. Whereas many legal scholars have known this for a long time, IR scholars seem to have
something like an obsession with a certain version of (legal) formalism. Indeed, it is amazing to
observe how neatly boundaries between interpretative communities follow boundaries between legal
and political practice. IR-scholars in particular seem to have serious difficulties in recognising the
existence of a European constitution. Instead, as we just saw, they know for "a fact" that there is no
such thing.
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How, then, can a link between treaty reform and constitutionalism be established? It may be necessary
to emphasize that our structurationist point of departure implies that we do not a priori assume which
agents and structures are prime players for the constitutional process. Instead, we seek to identify a
cluster of agents which all have an impact on the constitutional process. In doing this, we depart from
every possible unitary actor perspective on states, and we allow for unintended consequences of
strategic interaction. Following Stone and Sandholtz (1997), we treat parliaments, courts,
constitutional discourses and legal systems as institutions. Furthermore, we treat law professors,
lawyers and judges as much as agents as those who are traditionally regarded as policy- and
decision-makers. 
Nevertheless, constitutional reform looks like a co-constitutive process that requires the involvement
of both legal and political actors. So far the involvement has been markedly asymmetrical. It has
predominantly been actors in the legal sphere which have reasoned in terms of constitutionalization.
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constitution resonates more in some quarters than in others.(9)
Critics might argue that our dual – political and legal – conception of treaty reform and
constitutionalization is just a mirror image of the good old split between legal and political science
perspectives on social affairs; that we should know better, because legal perspectives are just that, and
therefore something which "enlightened" IR-scholars have left behind in the process of becoming
liberated from legalism; that E.H.Carr already noted the impotence of legalism; that the soul of the
IR-discipline is to have moved beyond legal scholarship; and so forth.
We are aware of such arguments, but in our view they lack validity for a number of reasons. First,
because we do not defend legalism, and we do not have a weak spot for positive law. Second,
because it seems to us that a large part of legal scholarship is more sophisticated than the average
IR-scholar is ready to acknowledge. Third, because certain legal theories, and not the most modern,
live their own quiet and secret life in various IR theories, from Hedley Bull to Kenneth Waltz. Fourth,
just as a ‘law in context’ school has emerged (cf. its celebration by Weiler, 1997), we make a plea for
an ‘IR in context’ perspective. In this respect we consider structuration theory to be a helpful aid in
the creation of such a perspective (Christiansen, 1998). Finally we note that at least some strands of
legal scholarship – those concerned with the construction of a system of written and unwritten rules
and norms in the international realm are currently being reconsidered in the context of IR theorising
(Onuf, 1989; Kratochvil, 1989).
IV. An Alternative View of ‘Intergovernmental’ Conferences:
The Image of Summits and Valleys
According to this image IGCs are seen as important events in the history of EU treaty reform. A
simple count provides us with the information that five major IGCs have taken place since the first in
1950-51 and the one concluded in 1996-97.(10) These five IGCs are the ‘mountain summits’. It
should be added that we do not have problems with accounts that call the outcome of IGCs
super-systemic decisions, to use Peterson’s (1995) vocabulary. It is very appropriate, and, generally,
we do not dispute the traditional conception of IGCs. Our argument is rather that the isolation of
IGCs creates an unnecessarily narrow conception of the role of IGCs, and by extension that a
broadening of the perspective gives us a better understanding of the nature and function of EU treaty
reform. How can such broadening look like? It seems to us that IGCs, i.e. the ‘summits’, should be
analysed in connection with the ‘valleys’ between them. This means that we arrive at an image that
includes four phases, i.e. the intermediate phases that are located between the five IGCs since 1950: 
Figure 1
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While we admit that IGCs are important events, we argue that IGCs can only be analysed in
connection with their "base". In other words, events research and process research are complementary
research designs. They are not competing in an analytical zero-sum game. Which type of connection
between IGCs and base do we have in mind? Which ‘base’ are we talking about?
Social and material structures constitute part of the base, e.g. the acquis conferencielle, i.e. the
revision procedure laid down by the treaties; the acquis communautaire is a social structure, or rather
a cluster of social structures, of immense importance for European governance. Gialdino (1995)
claims it useful to introduce a distinction between different types of acquis: i) the accession acquis; ii)
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acquis. But the term has also been introduced in policy-specific areas. Thus, Wiener, talks about the
acquis concerning citizenship, and others about the acquis politique (.e. the acquis in foreign policy)
or the Schengen acquis.
A closer look at the process of constitutionalization which has occurred in the valleys – hidden from
the view of the summit-watchers – indicates that governments have been unable to control treaty
reform. Thus, what we are talking about is controlof IGCs as well as the control of
institution-building and constitutional reform that happens between IGCs. In fact, this has been the
case since the very inception of the Community. But already Monnet suggested that was difficult to
maintain that governments were in full control of even the very first European integration IGC. Some
significant ideas were introduced by actors outside governments, and other ideas and organizational
designs had been around since the 1930s (Griffiths, 1997). Socialization and adaptation occurred
throughout the conference.
Important things happened after the first IGC, in what turned out to be the first intermediate phase.
As a result, the basic political-organizational superstructure of what became an institutionalized
Europe was created, not during specific instances of treaty reform, but as part of a process during the
intermediate phases between IGCs (Griffiths and Milward, 1986). This is an argument that we make
in more detail, in the next section, for the most recent instance of treaty reform. But in order to show
that this is a perception that holds true more generally for the European Union, we briefly look at
processes of constitutional change in the past.
The vertical distribution of power between Member States and Union institutions – an issue of federal
constitutionalization if there ever was one – was not settled at any one IGC. While the Paris and
Rome Treaties ‘specified’ certain provisions regarding the relative weight of individual Member States
and the Community, the arrangement which dominated this relationship for some 20 years resulted
from an extra-treaty agreement among governments, the so-called Luxembourg Compromise. Every
student of European integration will be aware of this feature which was meant to safeguard the
national veto in the Council in the face of contrasting provisions in the treaty. Even though it was
never espoused by the ECJ or became part of written law, it certainly was a constitutional settlement
of fundamental significance.
Later IGCs responded to the inefficiencies created by the Luxembourg Compromise by specifying the
areas in which qualified majority vote would become the norm. The Single European Act, in
particular, must be regarded as such. The very nature of the ‘bargain’ struck in the IGC preceding the
SEA – the linkage between market liberalization and institutional reform – cannot be understood if it
is not seen against the background of 20 years of national veto in the Council.
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In those decades, other devices had been added to the institutional structure of the Community, but
had not arisen from the treaty. An obvious one to mention is the institution of the European Council.
It is impossible to imagine the EU today without the European Council, which is so closely tied to the
presidency of the Council of Ministers. But it is no secret that the European Council was not the
result of a treaty change, but an informal and ad hoc response for the need for bargaining at the
highest level. This, in turn, became necessary in the mid-1970s, because the agenda of the Community
had widened to an extent that required the direct participation of the holders of highest national
political office in EC decision-making.
The Luxembourg compromise, the European Council and the greater weight given to the Presidency
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these devices were explicitly designed to strengthen the intergovernmental aspect of the Community
and thus to preserve every Member State’s ability to set and control the agenda. On the other hand,
this had the countervailing effect on the national level. Foreign Ministries, as managers of the
Presidency programme, and Prime Ministers, as participants in the European Council, became
increasingly exposed to, and eventually socialized into, the ‘Community method’ and the requirements
of searching for and achieving consensus. Just as the EC became ‘re-nationalized’, national
governments became increasingly ‘Europeanized’. In the process, they added weight and significance
– and thus power – to European level decision-making. By holding regular ‘summits’ and
institutionalising these, EC decision-making became, almost by default, an issue of high politics, even
though, in substance, it might not have been regarded as such.
This is the EU equivalent of what in federal theory has been called the ‘Madisonian paradox’
(Dehousse, 1989) – the search of constituent units for greater influence in the process of central
decision-making leading inevitably to central decision-making becoming relatively more significant,
while sub-central autonomy inevitably suffers. Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s, the Community
had gone through fundamental transformations, which saw both national and European institutions in
substantially altered roles from the ones envisaged in the treaty – even though no IGC had been held
and, on paper, nothing had changed.
This is no isolated instance of treaty reform outside the IGC – it is the normal way in which the
European institutions have always been reformed. There is no space here to conduct a comprehensive
survey, but a brief glance at the way in which two key policies – CFSP and EMU – became part of the
EU’s portfolio will serve to confirm the argument. The development of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy, now an integral part of the structure of the EU, began in the 1970s as ‘European
Political Cooperation’ (EPC). For some 15 years EPC remained entirely outside the treaty and was
therefore an informal process of co-ordination and cooperation among Member State foreign
ministries. This gradual establishment of CFSP can hardly be understood as the outcome of so-called
national interests of Member States. It makes more sense to regard the creation of EPC and its
development into CFSP as the result of the sectoral interests among foreign ministry officials and
ministers who had, over previous decades, lost considerable control over the integration process as
sectoral ministries took over the expanding agenda of Community business. Later IGCs merely
formalised the practices of European foreign policy-making that had already become established.
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The creation of the single currency also demonstrates a pattern of gradual evolution. Key decisions
which were to provide the basis for later ratification through the Maastricht Treaty where made in the
course of setting up the European Monetary System (EMS) and the Delors Committee. The EMS was
set up in the late 1970s and constituted the backbone of European economic cooperation for 15 years,
thus laying the foundations of economic convergence and policy-learning in the field of monetary
policy. On this basis, the Delors Committee, composed of central bank presidents and chaired by the
Commission president, developed the blueprint of a single currency as it was later set out in the
Maastricht Treaty. To be sure, issues of high political tension – such as the British opt-out – still
needed to be resolved in the course of subsequent summits and IGCs, but we can say with hindsight
that the key decisions regarding monetary union – the choice in favour of a single currency and the
agreement about a ‘stability-oriented’ monetary policy – had been made before the IGC. In addition, a
number of crucial issues – the precise degree of independence of the European Central Bank, the
relationship between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’, the policing of member States’ deficit spending – all
remained to be resolved after Maastricht. Clearly, the IGC was just one stepping stone on the way
towards monetary union, and it does not seem to have been the most important one.
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– of over-powering mountain summits and insignificant intermediate valleys – needs to be reversed.
The image of mountain summits is misleading since the crucial choices about the nature of treaty
reform are not made at momentous IGCs, but in fact result from long-term processes. Our critique of
the conventional wisdom that governments take key decisions about the nature of the integration
process at IGCs rests on three conclusions.
First, Member State representatives spend as much – perhaps more – time shaping constitutional
decisions outside as they do during IGCs. Corbett (1992: 271-2) notes that concerning negotiations
about the future of the EC/EU, "Member States have been engaged in such a process in more years
than not", which leads to Corbett’s highly interesting observation that "negotiations about the future
direction of the EC is, in fact, the norm rather than the exception" (emphasis added).
Second, given that the EU’s constitutional choices are shaped outside the insulated meeting rooms of
the IGC, a plurality of actors actively participate in the process. Much like the more mundane process
of policy-making, treaty reform has spawned a network of actors, a body of highly ‘technical’
knowledge and purpose-made rules of procedure which include non-state actors – Commission
officials, private interests, MEPs – as well as Member States’ representatives. Even the very question
of who represents the Member States is being redefined in these circumstances, as sectoral ministers,
constitutional courts, central bankers, local and regional governments become actively involved in the
process. In short, admitting that treaty reform is not an event (with clearly defined membership) but a
process (with fairly open access to a wide range of interests) is to admit that Member States loose
control over the decision-making process.
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Finally, we have seen that treaty reform is a heavily structured process. Actors – Member State
representatives as well as non-state actors – are not free to make any agreement they see fit, but
choose certain avenues among the limited options available. We can identify four such elements of
structure. First, there is the pre-existing institutional order that can at best be tempered with. More
usually, though, actors have simply accepted the emergence of a certain institutional development and
used treaty reform to codify and add to the existing structure. Second, treaty reform has had to accept
the Community legal order and the vast and constantly expanding acquis. Given that legal order and
the significance of the judicial review exercised by the ECJ, agency has been tightly circumscribed.
Thirdly, there are discursive structures that to a significant extent predefine what IGCs are about and
can achieve. This includes both the language used in the preparation and justification of treaty reform
and the public debate surrounding the integration process at large. Even though IGC proceedings are
of limited transparency, a certain range of options is defined by the way in which treaty reform has
been framed in the public domain. Finally, the nature of the economic order in Europe is a canvass on
which treaty reform has to be painted. Economic structures include the changing nature of domestic
political economies but more significantly the process of globalization that has driven European
integration from the outset. 
It is against the insights from the brief historical overview undertaken here that we now look at the
Amsterdam Treaty, or rather the Amsterdam processes. We have found that, in the past, treaty reform
has been a process of long-term constitutional change which has mainly taken place in the
periods between IGCs 
has been driven by a plurality of actors which include Member State representatives as well as
non-state actors 
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available choices. 
We would expect that we find the same to be true for the case of Amsterdam, and that from that basis
we can make more general conclusions about the nature of the process of EU treaty reform.
V. The Amsterdam Process
When was Amsterdam? In the early summer of 1997? Even the summit-watchers would agree that
one needs to start a little earlier and consider the development of the actual Intergovernmental
Conference. One issue of potentially great significance – the issue of flexible integration was –
according to participants settled in 7 minutes at the end of the summit, yet the IGC had worked on the
relevant passages for 15 months. With such examples it is not difficult to assume that most decisions
were made at the IGC, not the actual Amsterdam European Council. But the IGC hardly started from
a clean table. Governments who were keen to circumscribe the agenda of the IGC in a reasoned
manner had previously instituted a so-called ‘Reflection Group’ whose report reflected, in effect, the
negotiations of the subsequent IGC. But even the reflections of this Group were, by and large,
predefined by an already existing agenda and the fact that the convening of a new IGC to deal with
any unfinished business had been written into the Maastricht Treaty. The ‘result’ of the Amsterdam
summit – the Amsterdam Treaty – was therefore not so much a reflection of decisions taken by
politicians at the summit, but rather of the way in which the evolving agenda of the EU had been
processed by EU and national officials in the preceding years.
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But let us nevertheless briefly, just for the sake of argument, perceive Amsterdam as an event and
review the ‘decisions’ that were taken there. Following after the argument made above this is
obviously a hypothetical exercise, but one that we will execute in all honesty. Thus we can identify
three major types of decisions taken at Amsterdam. These areas are, firstly, institutional reforms;
secondly, the introduction of ‘flexible integration’; and thirdly, adjustments made to the contents of
the three pillars. A brief look at each of these will serve to identify the degree to which the above
conclusions about treaty reform are confirmed in this case.
Institutional reform consisted of changes for each of the three legislating institutions. The EP was
given extended powers in a range of areas. Was this a decision made at Amsterdam? Or was it rather
the logical result of a process that began with the introduction of direct elections in 1979 – yet
another instance of a fundamental change to the European constitution decided outside any IGC – and
carried on through similar instances of gradual upgrading of parliamentary powers at the previous two
IGCs. An expanding number of inter-institutional agreements has already tied the EP into the
everyday workings of the Union. The continuing discourse about the democratization of the EU and
its closeness to the citizens did its part to ensure that there was never any doubt that an improvement
of the EP’s institutional position would be on the agenda for, as well as in the Treaty of, Amsterdam.
The final shape of the reform will only become clear, as it did with the changes effected at Maastricht,
once the EP gets down to testing the limits of what it can, and cannot, do with its new powers.
The key ‘decision’ about the Commission – to limit its size in the face of enlargement – was even
more obviously a non-decision. It has been linked explicitly to the number of new Member States
joining the Union at the next round of enlargement. By indicating the number of Member States (20)
at which each state will get to nominate only one Commissioner, the IGCs has effectively left the final
decision to wider changes dominated by other issues (since it is inconceivable that one of the larger
states will veto the 20+ enlargement to protect its second Commissioner post). The way in which
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the progress on enlargement.
The Commission – which had itself proposed the reduction of Commissioners to one per Member
State – proposed in its Agenda 2000 to start enlargement negotiations with six applicant countries.
This would bring the total membership of the Union to 21 – something which may not be a
coincidence. Governments are neither formally nor informally in control of enlargement negotiations.
The ‘final decision’ on enlargement requires parliamentary approval, and preparations for, and
negotiation of, membership requires such an amount of technical information that the Commission,
more than any other actor, is in the driving seat here.
The decision on voting in the Council of Ministers, which – like the size of the Commission – was
seen as an essential reform in view of enlargement, was even more comprehensively ‘not decided’ at
Amsterdam but deferred to a later date. It was mentioned in the Treaty, and a future settlement was
envisaged, so that no further ceremonially "full-blown" IGC will be needed to settle this issue – a
treaty change agreed by a minor non-ceremonial IGC on the fringes of the Council or European
Council might do the job. This is perhaps the clearest example to date that ceremonial IGCs fail to
provide the forum in which constitutional issues of this complexity could be settled.
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A second major change was the introduction of ‘flexible integration’ (Edwards and Philippart, 1997).
The provision is designed to permit groups of Member States to go ahead with further integration in
the absence of general agreement to develop the EU further. Towards this aim they may, under
certain circumstances, use the institutions of the EU. In many ways this is the reverse of opt-outs that
had been one of the features at Maastricht. At Maastricht (and subsequently at Edinburgh), the
majority of Member States keen to move integration forward and frustrated with the obstinacy of a
small minority, had to accept a departure from the previous principle of universal application of EU
rules and decisions. In important areas such as social policy or monetary union, agreement on further
integration was only possible after Member States received the right to ‘opt-out’. At Amsterdam, the
tables were turned and the pro-integrationist Member States adopted the possibility of selected
‘opt-in’ in the form of flexible integration – a development initially opposed by those Member States
left behind. But the practice – a Europe characterized by ‘multiple speeds’ or of ‘variable geometry’ –
had been a reality established long time before and remained essentially the same.
Flexible integration implies the unintended consequence of at least a number of Member States
(non-opt-ins) loosing actual control over, and influence on, the integration process. The governments
in question were naturally keen to prevent flexible integration and the resultant loss of control over
the future development of the integration process, but – as the principle of differentiated integration
had been established earlier – this proved impossible. Institutionalized flexibility, then, can be seen as a
substitute for formal treaty reform.
Finally, an important feature of Amsterdam had been the move of substantial parts from pillar three to
pillar one, and the incorporation of the Schengen agreement and its acquis into the EU structure. As
with EPC in the SEA and the recognition of the WEU in Maastricht this was essentially the
codification of an already existing aspect of integration among a group of governments. Like the EMS
and the WEU, Schengen had been developed outside the Community framework, by some
governments, but was, at the same time, closely linked to the mainstream integration process.
Bringing it into the treaty – while at the same time confirming the opt-out for those governments (UK
and Ireland) that wished to remain outside it – was little more than the formal culmination of a
process that had begun in 1985.(11) This is not to deny that important decisions on the details of this
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not predestined, but were actually taken by governments in the course of negotiations. In this case, as
in general, our argument is not that the shape of ‘intergovernmental’ agreements is wholly determined
by structural factors, but merely that it is the interplay between governmental (as well as
supranational) agency and elements of structure which explains the nature of treaty reform.
We can see now that the Amsterdam Treaty did not constitute the ‘moment’ at which governmental
representatives took the decisive steps towards further integration. At most, they bargained over the
way in which existing trends in the integration process – the increasing significance of the European
Parliament, the achievement of greater efficiency in the Commission and the active use of
differentiated integration – were formally incorporated into the treaty.
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VI. Conclusions
This paper is about the development of an alternative research strategy on treaty reform. Towards that
aim we have introduced a theoretical perspective that enables rather than constrains novel
interpretations. A structurationist perspective along the lines presented here does not prejudice one
set of actors above any others. A focus on the procedural nature of treaty reform has brought into
view a much wider range of actors than is traditionally studied in state-centric analyses. The
significance of their role in the treaty reform process is a matter of empirical research – but we believe
this paper has shown that missing out on such an avenue for empirical research is a blind spot of
intergovernmental approaches.
An emphasis on ‘process’ puts the negotiation of treaty changes into the wider perspective of
constitutional reform. And while traditional analyses regard IGCs as the ‘summits’ of treaty reform, a
wider focus reveals that important developments actually occur in the ‘valleys’ of constitutional
reform. On occasion, IGCs make important changes to the treaty structure of the Union, but more
often they merely codify changes which have already occurred. The constitutionalization of the Union
– the most significant aspect of treaty reform – has taken place away from the ‘intergovernmental’
negotiating table, in the depths of the ‘valleys’ between IGCs. The same is true for the other key
institutional features of the Union: the institutionalisation of regular meetings of heads of state and
government, the development of mechanisms of foreign policy co-ordination, the growing significance
of the Presidency, the empowerment of the European Parliament and the introduction of differentiated
integration through selected ‘opt-outs’ and ‘opt-ins’.
Crucially, a structurationist approach allows us see the link between these ‘summits’ and ‘valleys’ as a
continuous and open-ended process of treaty reform, structured not by the interests and resources of
Member States, but by the social institutions that are established and reproduced in the course of
reform. This does include Member State agency, and the arguments presented here should not be
misunderstood as an attempt to replace the representation of national interests with structural
determinancy. In the perspective adopted here, agency, including that from national governments,
continues to matter and to make a difference. Indeed, this sensitivity to patterns of agency and their
ability to change the course of events is what distinguishes structuration theory from straightforward
structural approaches. But, compared to traditional studies of treaty change, our perspective leads us
to see governmental agency in the context of a structural environment – the trajectory of past
decisions, the multilateral generation of reform agendas, the institutionalised patterns of negotiation
and decision-making, the constitutionalisation of the EU order – which severely compromises the
ability of national governments to negotiate on the basis of their ‘national interests’. 
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the existing process of intergovernmental conferences to amend and adapt the Union’s
Treaties has reached the end of its useful life. The EU cannot afford the repetition of a
protracted process of intergovernmental negotiation followed by the anti-climax of
negative political conclusions drawn at the end of the day (1998).
But what if an IGC to end all IGCs is convened? It would obviously be a zenith of European
constitutionalism, but it would equally be the end-product of a very long constitutional process. This
is a hypothetical question: there are, presently, no signs of any such event – it simply is not in the
nature of the evolutionary process of European integration.
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Instead, Amsterdam has confirmed what turn out to be general principles of EU treaty reform: IGCs
are not the key events in treaty reform as they are often hailed; they are not isolated events but
embedded in a wider process; and national governments are not in control of this process. The more
important phases of treaty reform, conceived as constitutional reform, occur during the intervening
phases between IGCs – it is in those periods that the crucial decisions about the shape of a European
constitution are taken. This includes not only agenda-setting and implementation – which, as we know
from the study of public policy-making, are as important as the actual process of decision-making –
but also the very taking of decisions and creation of institutional structures.
If anything, Amsterdam, with its high incidence of ‘non-decisions’, has further formalised the way in
which governments have accepted their inability to control the process. In a number of key instances
the actual ‘decision’ about institutional reform has been left explicitly to small ‘technical’ IGCs or to
non-IGC venues and times. Flexible integration is perhaps the best example to date to demonstrate
that constitutionalization will not be settled for a long time – if at all it is possible to imagine a final
solution in constitutional politics. In permitting a small group of governments to press ahead, using
the Union’s institutional structure and thus developing it further, it has been made abundantly clear
that individual states have lost control over the direction and final destination of the process.
In leaving, now formally, constitutional reform to the intermediate phases between IGCs (and
reducing IGCs to mere ratification and legitimation exercises), national governments have also
accepted that other actors will come in and influence the process (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 1998).
Perhaps more interestingly yet, they have also accepted the significance of structural changes which
cannot be anticipated. The Amsterdam process is a prime example of how actors bowing to the
limitations which legal, discursive and economic structures place on their potential for action.
Finally, on a sobering note, one may ask whether the Amsterdam Treaty even serves as an attempt to
addressing the constitutional issues that were called for. It was an IGC that was explicitly meant to
prepare the Union for the process of enlargement. But not much research is required to note that
enlargement – just like monetary union – will introduce a lot of further uncertainty into European
constitutionalization. Both are designed as long-term processes with a significant number of
constitutional issues to be settled in due course. Both processes require responses from the Union
about the relationship between its parts and its whole, about its commitment to redistribution, about
the accountability of its central institutions and about the way in which ‘history-making’ decisions are
being made. With regard to EMU one only needs to point to the potential disputes between the ‘ins’
and the ‘outs’ to recognize that crucial decisions about the nature of the post-EMU EU still need to
be taken. The very existence of an EMU Council had not been decided at Maastricht, nor was its
potential membership being discussed. The EMU dispute about the degree to which the ‘outs’ may
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the active use of flexibility. The EMU experience demonstrates that these constitutional choices are
not made at IGCs, but in the ‘valleys’ between them.
The decisions relating to enlargement, the conditions of and negotiations for membership as well as
the institutional adaptation of the Union were also not taken at Amsterdam. As with EMU, the big
choices were presented to the Union after the IGC. The Commission, in publishing its Agenda 2000,
set the agenda and has to a significant degree structured later developments. The 1997 Luxembourg
summit attempted a partial departure from the proposal of the Commission – papering over the
distinction between the first wave of entrants and the rest – but has also found it hard to leave the
trajectory of further developments envisaged by the Commission. And the red-green government
elected in Germany in 1998 made it its Presidency goal for the first half of 1999 to conclude the
reforms set out in Agenda 2000 – an ‘agenda’ proposed by the Commission and generally seen as a
precondition for enlargement. In it are contained the fundamental changes to the structures of the
Union which one could have expected from an IGC.
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If we compare the twin processes of EMU and Agenda 2000/enlargement on the one hand, and the
treaty reform undertaken at Amsterdam on the other, we see how in the 1990s even more than
previously the fundamental choices about the nature of the integration process are made outside the
formal venue of IGCs. Given the significance of both enlargement and monetary union, it is really
nothing short of extraordinary that the event ‘Amsterdam’ did not succeed to engage in a serious
reform of constitutional issues resulting from these processes. The only way of making sense of this
development is the recognition that governments have now accepted formally that treaty reform does
not occur during but in-between IGCs. That in itself is a constitutional settlement, one that has now
been codified by the 1996-97 IGC.
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Endnotes
(*) A previous version of this paper was presented at a panel at the British International Studies
Association's annual conference in December 1997 and at a meeting in Brussels in May 1998. We
would like to thank Geoffrey Edwards and Eric Philippart (who directed both meetings), and all
participants in the two meetings for constructive suggestions. We are also grateful to Mark Gray,
Amy Verdun, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Lars Bo Kaspersen, for detailed comments on an earlier
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EIoP: Text 1999-001: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-001.htmdraft. We would also like to thank the two anonymous referees of the EIoP for their helpful
comments.
(1) For a more balanced approach, see Edwards and Pijpers (eds.) 1997.
(2) For a similar view, see Westlake 1998.
(3) For critiques of intergovernmentalism in European integration theory, see for example Dehousse
and Majone (1994), Forster (1998), Mattli and Burley (1995), Matlary (1993), Wincott (1995),
Marks et al. (1997) and Wind (1997).
(4) Structuration theory has been introduced to the field of International Relations by Wendt (1987)
and Carlsnaes (1992). For a very useful exchange of views on the value of structuration theory, see
Hollis and Smith (1991) and Wendt (1991). On the use of structuration theory in the context of
European integration, see Snyder (1990) and Christiansen (1997). On the relationship between
scientific realism and structuration theory, see Wendt and Shapiro (1997).
(5) http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/.
(6) For a discussion of the use of external pressures on the integration process as a determining
influence see Zimmerling (1990).
(7) Interviews with officials from Member State administrations, Council Secretariat and Commission
who participated in the negotiations leading to the Amsterdam Treaty, Brussels, April 1998.
(8) In what became an infamous draft in preparation for the Maastricht summit, the then Dutch
Deputy Foreign Minister Piet Dankert proposed a Treaty which was widely perceived as too 'federal'
and which was dismissed by the IGC in favour of the previous Luxembourg Draft – a step backwards
both in terms of the progress made during the conference and in terms of Dankert's own federalist
ambitions.
(9) We do not want to create artificially watertight dividing-lines between 'legal' and 'political' actors.
Clearly the ECJ is to some degree also a 'political power' (Alter, 1995), while Member State
governments sometimes find it hard to refrain from playing the part of judge, as the example of the
Barber Protocol demonstrates (Curtin, 1993; Gialdino, 1995). What we can say is that political actors
like the governments and the European Parliament have not recognized – at least not explicitly – that
the treaties constitute a European constitution. But there certainly is a tacit understanding that the
Union's legal order has been constitutionalized by the ECJ and by the interpretative legal community.
(10) Formally, ten IGC's have taken place between 1961 and 1997: Extending the area of territorial
implementation of the association system of the countries and territories to the Dutch West Indies, 13
November 1962 (OJ L 150, 01.10.64); The Treaty of Brussels fusing the executives of the
Commission and Council, 8 April 1965 (OJ 152, 13.07.67); Treaty of Luxembourg, 22 April 1970
(OJ L 2, 02.01.71) – Budgetary measures; Treaty of Brussels, 10 July 1975 (OJ L 91, 06.04.78) –
Budgetary measures; Amendment of the status of the European Investment Bank, 22 July 1975 (OJ L
359, 31.12.77); Exclusion of Greenland from the territory of the Community, 13 March 1984 (OJ L
29, 01.02.85); Single European Act (OJ L 169, 29.06.87); Treaty on European Union, 7 February
1992 (OJ L 224, 31.08.92); Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997 (OJ C 340, 10.11.97). The Treaty
of Paris (1951), Treaties of Rome (1957), Treaty of the Saar (1958) and the Convention on certain
Institutions common to the European Communities (1958) were modified without recourse to the
procedure laid down in the treaties and were thus not formal IGC's. (Article 96 ECSC, Article 236
EEC). We are very grateful to Mark Gray for providing this information.
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EIoP: Text 1999-001: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-001.htm(11) See Weiler (1993) for an argument about the permeability of the pillar structure of the Maastricht
Treaty.
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Summits and Valleys in the Process of EU Treaty Reform,
1950-1997(*)
 
(*) There is a clear nexus but not a complete overlap between, on the one hand, our distinction
between 'summits' and 'valleys' and, on the other hand, William Wallace's distinction between formal
and informal integration – the latter being more general. See Wallace (1990).
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